Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo by Han, Seunghee et al.
 
Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Han, Seunghee, Jennifer S. Lerner and Richard Zeckhauser.  2010.
Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo.  Faculty
Research Working Paper Series, RWP10-021, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University.
Published Version http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.as
px?PubId=7337
Accessed February 18, 2015 8:09:41 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4449096
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA 
 
 
 
 
Disgust Promotes Disposal: 
Souring the Status Quo 
Faculty Research Working Paper Series 
 
 
Seunghee Han 
Carnegie Mellon University 
 
Jennifer S. Lerner 
Harvard Kennedy School 
 
Richard Zeckhauser 
Harvard Kennedy School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2010 
RWP10-021 
 
 
The views expressed in the HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of 
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of 
G o v e r n m e n t  o r  o f  H a r v a r d  U n i v e r s i t y .   F a c u l t y  R e s e a r c h  W o r k i n g  P a p e r s  h a v e  n o t  
undergone formal review and approval.  Such papers are included in this series to elicit 
feedback and to encourage debate on important public policy challenges. Copyright 
belongs to the author(s).  Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. 
 
www.hks.harvard.edu 
 Disgust disposal effect    1 
Running head: DISGUST PROMOTES DISPOSAL 
 
                               
                    
Disgust Promotes Disposal: 
Souring the Status Quo 
 
Seunghee Han  
Carnegie Mellon University 
 
Jennifer S. Lerner 
Harvard University 
Richard Zeckhauser 
Harvard University 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: emotion, disgust, status quo bias, choice, decision making 
Word Count:  4975   
 
 
 
 
Contact Information 
Jennifer S. Lerner, Professor   
Harvard Kennedy School 
79 JFK Street 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
Phone: 617-495-9962 
Email: Jennifer_Lerner@harvard.edu Disgust disposal effect    2 
Abstract 
Humans naturally dispose of objects that disgust them.  Is this phenomenon so deeply embedded 
that even incidental disgust – i.e., where the source of disgust is unrelated to a possessed object – 
triggers disposal?  Two experiments were designed to answer this question.  Two film clips 
served as disgust and neutral primes; the objects were routine commodities (boxes of office 
supplies).  Results revealed that the incidental disgust condition powerfully increased the 
frequency with which decision makers traded away a commodity they owned for a new 
commodity  (more than doubling the probability in each condition), thereby countering otherwise 
robust status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988).  Decision makers were unaware of 
disgust’s impact.  Even when warned to correct for it, they failed to do so.  These studies 
presented real choices with tangible rewards.  Their findings thus have implications not only for 
theories of affect and choice, but also for practical improvements in everyday decisions. 
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Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo 
Charles Darwin (1872) defined disgust as “…something revolting, primarily in relations 
to the sense of taste…” (p. 253).  His analysis treated disgust as a basic emotion along with 
anger, fear, sadness, and happiness (Ekman & Davidson, 1994).  Indeed, disgust satisfies all the 
modern criteria of a basic emotion, as articulated by Ekman (1992), encompassing distinctive 
behavioral, physiological, and expressive components as well as experiential components.   
More recent definitions of disgust have stressed its function of triggering rejection of bad-
tasting or health-threatening food (e.g., Angyal, 1941; Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Frijda, 1986).  
Disgust has been assumed to play a role in indicating that a substance should either be avoided or 
expelled if ingestion has already occurred.  Rozin and his colleagues, who have extensively 
studied the evolution of disgust, extended the concept beyond food-related stimuli by observing 
that anything that reminds us of our animal origins can elicit disgust (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 
1994; Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000).  These studies find that, in 
addition to food, as many as eight domains—including body products, animals, sexual behaviors, 
contact with death or corpses, violations of the exterior envelope of the body, poor hygiene, 
interpersonal contamination, and certain moral offenses—can elicit disgust.   
This wide range of physical and social elicitors makes disgust a common experience in 
daily life.  It also plays a significant role in affecting behaviors.  Heath, Bell, and Sternberg (2001) 
identified disgust as one of the emotions most frequently evoked by contemporary urban legends 
that propagate through subcultures and drive mass-scale consumer behavior.  For example, 
rumors of food contamination often elicit social panic.  Two recent high-impact advertising Disgust disposal effect    4 
campaigns drew on disgust to promote public health.  First, graphic pictures of smoking related 
diseases printed on Canadian cigarette packages are reported to have elicited strong disgust from 
smokers and were correlated with reduced smoking and smoking cessation (Hammond, Fong, 
McDonald, Brown, & Cameron, 2004).  Second, disgust has been successfully employed in a 
public campaign for hand washing (Duhigg, 2008).  The TV advertisements showed mothers and 
children walking out of bathrooms with a glowing purple pigment on their hands that 
contaminated everything they touched.  The use of soap after using the toilet increased.  
Considering its widespread role in society, the effects of disgust on people’s everyday choices 
deserve investigation.  To date, however, disgust has received only scant attention in experiments 
seeking to determine its causal role in individual decision making.  
The present studies examine how disgust affects choices between something already 
possessed and an alternative not yet possessed.  Such choices are common, involving, for 
example, jobs, significant others, and many physical possessions.  Under ordinary circumstances, 
decision makers faced with this sort of choice reliably favor retaining a status quo over other 
options  This status quo bias (SQB) persists even when a current possession has been randomly 
and/or arbitrarily assigned (e.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), and even when retaining the 
status quo option confers financial cost (e.g., Hartman, Doane, & Woo, 1991).     
There are strong reasons to hypothesize disgust might counteract SQB.  As with the anti-
smoking campaign described above, we might assume that when an individual associates a current 
possession with a disgusting experience, the individual will view the possession as less attractive 
and will be more likely to replace it.  If someone receives a foul-smelling package, she is likely to Disgust disposal effect    5 
favor exchanging it for a fresh one.  But what if careful thought causes the owner to understand 
that the disgusting experience should not in fact influence the attractiveness of the possession?  
For example, suppose the package’s foul smell obviously came from the outside of the box and 
that the metal object inside was unlikely to be contaminated.  Will the offended owner still 
choose to reject the status quo object in favor of an alternative?  Alternatively, what if it became 
clear that the source of the disgust had nothing to do with the package (e.g., it came from being 
stored in a closet with a dead mouse)? Would disgust still trigger a desire to dispose of one’s 
possessions?  We conjecture that it would. 
In the present study, we investigate a strong version of the conjectured carryover effect of 
disgust.  Our two experiments present a “strong” test for the following three reasons.  First, we 
induce disgust in an experimental process rather than having participants experience it in 
naturalistic form.  We believe this lowers the intensity of disgust relative to what one would find 
in real life.  Second, we use objects that have nothing to do with the source of the disgust.  Third, 
we follow standard procedures from experimental economics, including only decisions with 
tangible consequences, to motivate participants to make decisions carefully and strategically.   
Three Alternative Hypotheses 
Based on the literature, at least three alternative hypotheses can be theoretically derived 
to describe the relationship between disgust and SQB.  We start with the null.  
Hypothesis 0: Incidental disgust exerts no influence on SQB.   
This pattern may occur for two very different reasons.  First, rational decision theory 
would hold that because incidental disgust is unrelated to the inherent attractiveness of two 
options, it should have no effect on the choice between them (Raiffa, 1997).  Second, influential Disgust disposal effect    6 
theories of affect and judgment (for a review, see Forgas, 2003) would hold that disgust, a 
negatively valenced emotion, may elicit a generalized devaluation of both present possessions and 
potential possessions because negative emotions would trigger generalized negative judgments 
across judgment domains.  If so, when disgusted, decision makers would simply retain the status-
quo because both what they presently have and what they might acquire are diminished in value.   
If null Hypothesis 0 is refuted, then Hypotheses 1 and 2 -- which predict effects in 
opposite directions -- should be tested.  
Hypothesis 1: Incidental disgust amplifies SQB.   
This hypothesis derives from the classic literature on arousal/social facilitation, which shows that 
increases in general arousal cause individuals to display their dominant response to the stimulus 
situation (See, for example, Foster, Witcher, Campell, & Green, 1998; Zajonc, 1965).  Disgust 
can be considered an emotion that intensifies arousal, if one considers the sympathetic nervous 
system response on multiple dimensions (Gross & Levenson, 1993; Levenson, Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1990); therefore, it would amplify the dominant response of retaining a status quo 
possession.   
Hypothesis 2: Incidental disgust counteracts SQB. 
This hypothesis derives from the appraisal-tendency framework (ATF; Lerner & Keltner, 
2001; for update, see Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007), which assumes that specific emotions give 
rise to cognitive and motivational characteristics that can account for the effect of each emotion 
on individuals’ decisions.  The ATF posits that disgust, which revolves around the appraisal 
theme of being too close to an indigestible object or an idea (for elaboration, see Lazarus, 1991), Disgust disposal effect    7 
will evoke an implicit tendency to dispose of current objects (Frijda, 1986; Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 2000).  If so, even incidental disgust would motivate decision makers to wish to 
exchange a status quo commodity for a new commodity.  Lerner et al. (2004) hypothesize that 
disgust will also evoke an implicit goal to avoid acquiring anything new.  However, in our study, 
the goal to expel should be stronger, because the disgusting event is both physically and 
temporally more associated with the status-quo commodity than with the alternative. Thus, 
disgust would promote disposal of a status quo object, thereby counteracting SQB.
 
If a disgust-disposal effect is found, it would reinforce an emerging literature 
demonstrating that emotions can profoundly alter otherwise robust regularities of human decision 
processes—in the present case, for instance, the preference for a status quo over an alternative 
(for a review see Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).  Moreover, it would reinforce surprising findings 
in the literature that even incidental emotions—i.e., emotions triggered by a factor unrelated to 
the decision at hand—can reverse people’s choices in decisions with real monetary consequences 
(e.g., Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004).  In effect, it would add to the growing evidence that 
emotions have the ability to overpower rational choice processes, thereby influencing decisions 
to which they have no normative relevance.   
We focus exclusively on disgust (as opposed to other negative emotions) because of the 
interesting questions that arise from the theories outlined above.  The hypothesized disposal 
effect implies that it would contrast with the otherwise robust human tendency to hold on to 
current objects, as evidenced in SQB. 
Finally, if either of the carryover patterns described is found when incidental disgust is 
induced, it is likely to be a non-conscious process.  That is, gut feelings rather than deliberative Disgust disposal effect    8 
processing would drive the phenomenon.  If they do, decision makers will lack clear insight into 
the emotional influences on their choice (Wilson & Brekke, 1994).  We will test this conjecture 
about insight and will also study whether calling participants’ attention to the phenomenon alters 
their choices.  
Study 1 
Study 1 took the form of a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial in which the emotion 
condition was crossed with two commodities.  The commodities were a square box and an oblong 
box of approximately equal weight and volume (see Figure 1).  The participants were told the 
boxes contained office supplies of equivalent value.
1   We presented undisclosed commodities in 
generic boxes that appeared equivalent in order to facilitate a clean test of the hypotheses, to 
ensure the results would generalize, and to clarify the decision processes of participants, who had 
little reason to choose one box over the other.   
Method 
Design and participants 
One-hundred-and-six individuals (54 males, 50 females, 2 unspecified) from a university 
community participated in exchange for a $10 show-up payment.  Participants ranged in age from 
16 to 29 (M = 20). 
Participants sat in cubicles and could not see each other.  They were given instructions 
that charged them with two separate tasks, which were combined for convenience.  Before they 
began the first task, participants randomly received either an oblong box or a square box. They 
were told the contents of the box were theirs to keep for participating in the study (see Figure 1).  Disgust disposal effect    9 
 Emotion induction.  Participants were randomly assigned to either a disgust condition or a 
neutral condition.  Disgust-condition participants watched a previously validated (Lerner et al., 
2004) video clip portraying a man using a filthy toilet (from the film Trainspotting).  Neutral-
condition participants watched a previously validated (Lerner et al., 2004) video clip about the 
Great Barrier Reef (from a National Geographic special), a nature documentary selected for its 
neutral effect on emotions.  Immediately after watching their clip, participants in the disgust 
condition were asked to write about how they would feel if they were in the situation depicted, 
and participants in the neutral condition were asked to write about their daily activities. 
           Trading decision.   To encourage a sense of ownership of the generic boxes, participants 
were invited to shake their box and guess what kind of office supplies the box might contain.  
Next, participants were given a new box, which they were also invited to shake.  They were told 
that the new box contained a different kind of office supply that was of equivalent value to that 
in the old box.  Participants were then asked to decide whether to keep the old box or exchange it 
for the new one.  Participants’ preferences between the status quo (the old box) and the 
alternative (the new box) were measured using established paradigms in experimental economics 
(e.g., Knetsch & Sniden, 1984).   
Manipulation check.  Immediately after making the trading decision, participants were 
asked to report how intensely they felt each of 20 emotions.  Four negative emotions were of 
primary interest: anger, sadness, fear, and disgust.   
Final questionnaire.  Participants also typed a response to an open-ended question: Why 
did you choose to exchange/keep the box you were given?  These responses were coded by 
research assistants.  Finally, participants answered demographic questions.  While participants Disgust disposal effect    10 
completed the questionnaire, the experimenter exchanged boxes for those who chose to trade.  
Participants kept the contents of their boxes, which pilot tests revealed to be moderately pleasing.  
Results 
Manipulation checks  
Emotions were effectively induced, both in magnitude and specificity.  Specifically, 
neutral-condition participants reported feeling significantly more neutral than disgusted (Mn = 
3.72 versus Md = 0.24), t (52) = 10.44, p < .001.  Disgust-condition participants reported feeling 
significantly more disgusted than neutral (Md = 5.54 versus Mn = 2.32), t (52) = 6.49, p < .001.  
They also reported feeling significantly more disgust than the other primary negative emotions: 
anger (Ma = 0.87, SD = 1.17) and sadness (Ms = 1.02, SD = 1.53). 
Main analyses   
Trading propensities.  The data were analyzed using logistic regressions.  Regardless of 
which commodity was randomly chosen to serve as the status quo, disgust-condition participants 
were significantly more likely (50.9%) to trade away their status-quo commodity than were 
neutral-condition participants (32.1%).  The difference was significant: Wald χ
2 (1, N = 106) = 
4.778, p < .05, Φ = .21.   
Note the significant status quo bias in the neutral condition; less than a third of these 
participants traded away their item.  Comparing the two box conditions, it is worth pointing out 
that participants were less willing to trade away the oblong box than the square box, suggesting 
an unpredicted preference for the oblong box, other factors held equal (see Table 1).  A critical 
baseline finding for us, however, is that the difference in the propensity to trade was virtually 
identical across the two types of boxes.   Disgust disposal effect    11 
Support for main hypothesis.  Our results reject Hypotheses 0 and 1, and support 
Hypothesis 2.  Relative to a neutral state, incidental disgust makes decision makers more likely to 
exchange a status quo commodity for a new commodity. This statistically significant effect of 
disgust on choice remained the same even when self-reported anger was entered in the equation as 
a covariate χ
2 (1, N=106) = 4.871, p < .05.  The same was true when sadness χ
2 (1, N=106) = 
4.649, p < .05, or anger and sadness together χ
2 (1, N=106) = 4.888, p < .05, were entered as 
covariates.  These results indicate that other negative emotions measured in the study, sadness 
and anger, did not explain additional variance in the observed disgust effect. 
Disgust thereby counteracts SQB.  The effect size was substantial (Φ = .21), as reported 
above.  Disgust more than doubled the propensity to exchange (oblong box) and raised it by more 
than half (square box), in accordance with the ATF prediction.   
Rationales for choices.  Participants’ explanations for choosing their preferred box were 
coded; the explanations conveyed no awareness of emotional carryover.  Apart from “random 
choice,” the most common rationales for choosing a box were: “makes a more interesting noise,” 
(21%) “feels more useful,”(28%) and “feels heavier.”(21%) 
Discussion 
Study one, using two virtually generic commodities, found that disgust can drive choice 
even when decision makers have no good reason to prefer one item over another.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, participants reported no influence of disgust on their choices, but identified other 
barely relevant characteristics as influences. 
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Study 2 
Carryover effects of disgust were solidly established in Study 1.  To gauge the potential 
importance of the phenomenon, Study 2 sought to examine whether decision makers can self-
correct for it when made aware of the possible carryover effects.  Wilson and Brekke’s 
authoritative review (1994) of judgment and decision biases identifies four factors necessary for 
bias correction: 1) awareness of unwanted processing; 2) awareness of direction and magnitude of 
the bias; 3) motivation to correct bias; 4) ability to adjust response.  Study 2 will provide the 
first three of these factors in an effort to observe whether decision makers can adjust their 
responses.  If, after providing all three factors, we observe no carryover, then we can conclude 
that disgusted decision-makers are indeed able to correct the carryover.  The phenomenon may 
hold less import if it is easily corrected.  We hypothesize, however, that the carryover of disgust 
will remain.  If correcting the disgust-disposal effect requires mentally disentangling the incidental 
disgust prime from the choice objects, then the disgust-disposal effect, which seemed to be driven 
by gut feelings rather than deliberative processing, is unlikely to be corrected even when decision 
makers’ attention is called to the phenomenon.  Thus, we propose:   
Hypothesis 3:  An otherwise effective warning will not negate the disgust-disposal effect. 
Method 
Study 2 took the form of a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial in which the emotion 
condition was crossed with a warning.  We made the oblong box the status quo, thus avoiding 
consideration of a further experimental factor (in Study 1, the results for both boxes supported 
Hypothesis 2).  Moreover, since the oblong box produced a higher ratio of trade behavior Disgust disposal effect    13 
between the disgust and neutral conditions, it allowed more potential to find a warning effect for 
disgust.   
Design and participants 
One-hundred-and-twenty university students (74 males, 45 females, 1 unspecified) 
participated in exchange for class credit.  Participants’ ages ranged from 18-25 (M = 20).  
Procedures matched those of Study 1, except as noted.   
Warning.  After the emotion induction and before making their choices, half the 
participants received the following written warning regarding emotional carryover from the film 
clip they had just seen:   
Watching film clips in the first  part of the study can bias choices in the second  part.  
Specifically, having just seen an unpleasant film can increase your desire to get rid of 
things you have in your possession.  Likewise, having just seen a pleasant film clip can 
increase  your  desire  to  keep  things  you  have  in  your  possession.    Because  we  are 
interested in studying how people can avoid being biased, please try your absolute best to 
avoid having any influence of the film clip on your decisions about the box!  Give us your 
honest choice, reflecting your own feelings about the box, regardless of the film clip you 
viewed.  
 
In the warning, the films were referred to as “pleasant” and “unpleasant,” corresponding 
to the neutral and disgust conditions respectively.
2  The warning specified the direction of 
potential bias: pleasant films (neutral condition) create a bias toward retaining the object 
possessed, whereas unpleasant firms (disgust condition) create a bias toward getting rid of the 
object.  Everyone in a warning condition received the text above.   
Trading decision.  Following Study 1’s methods, subjects were then given the second box, 
allowed to handle/shake it, and asked whether they wished to make a trade.
3   
Results Disgust disposal effect    14 
Manipulation check  
Emotion inductions were effective in magnitude and specificity.  Neutral-condition 
participants reported feeling significantly more neutral than disgusted (Mn = 3.30 versus Md = 
0.43 respectively), t (60) = 3.07, p = .003.  Disgust-condition participants reported feeling 
significantly more disgusted than neutral (Md  = 3.68 versus Mn = 2.37 respectively), t (58) = 
6.49, p < .001.  Disgust-condition participants also reported feeling significantly more disgust 
than any other measured negative emotion, including anger and sadness.  These results were 
consistent with Study 1. 
The warning was noted by participants: 91.7% said they remembered the warning about 
the possible biasing effects of the film, and 87.2% said the warning was believable. 
Main analyses   
The data were analyzed using logistic regressions.  In the no-warning (control) conditions, 
Study 1’s pattern was replicated.  Consistent with the main hypothesis, disgust-condition 
participants were much more likely (33.3%) to trade away their status-quo commodity than were 
neutral-condition participants (13.8%).  In the warning condition, the predicted asymmetric 
pattern emerged.  As was required for this test to be meaningful, neutral-condition participants 
heeded the warning, thus establishing appropriate conditions for the test of Hypothesis 3.  That 
is, neutral-condition participants (who were warned that the clip would bias them toward 
retaining their commodity) adjusted their choices as instructed, trading more frequently in the 
warning condition (Mn
no-warning = 13.8%, Mn
warning = 37.5%), Wald χ
2 (1, N = 61) = 4.127, p < 
.05, Φ = .26.   Disgust disposal effect    15 
Our prime interest was the effect of the warning (that the clip would bias them toward 
trading away their commodity) on disgust-condition participants.  We predicted a modest effect 
at best, and that is what we found.  Participants traded at the same rate independent of the 
warning manipulation (Md
no-warning = 33.3%, Md
warning = 31.0%), Wald χ
2 (1, N = 59) = 0.36, see 
Table 2).  This result supports Hypothesis 3; namely, even warnings that are effective elsewhere 
do not negate the disgust-disposal effect.
4 
As in Study 1, 90% of the participants in the disgust condition, whether warned or not, 
reported that viewing the unpleasant movie clip could not have influenced their own preferences.  
Yet because of the clip, both warned and unwarned groups increased their propensity to trade. 
As a check on reliability, a descriptive set of analyses compared trading from Study 1 
with trading levels in Study 2.  In order to create a clean, unconfounded comparison, we included 
only the conditions in Study 1 that had an oblong box as the initial possession (Study 2 used 
only oblong boxes).  As expected, comparing the trading level for the disgust condition across 
studies yielded no significant differences (42.3% in Study 1 versus 33.3% in Study 2).  Also as 
expected, comparing the trading level for the neutral condition yielded no significant  differences 
(21.1% in Study 1 versus 13.8% in Study 2).   
Discussion 
To recap, neutral-condition decision makers heeded the warning and engaged in 
substantially more trades when warned.
5  By contrast, disgust-condition decision makers traded 
away their status-quo commodity at the same rate whether or not they were warned against 
carryover effects.  This evidence supports our conjecture that the disgust-disposal effect Disgust disposal effect    16 
operates at such a basic level that it persists even in the presence of measures that would 
normally diminish them.
 6   
The robust effect of incidental disgust observed here may appear at odds with previous 
findings suggesting that incidental emotion effects tend to be fragile and often go away once an 
individual’s attention is drawn to the potential bias.  For example, Schwarz & Clore (1983) found 
that when an individual’s attention was drawn to weather, its effect on subjective well-being 
disappeared.  It should be pointed out, though, that whereas people might readily admit the 
effect of sunny weather on their sense of well-being, they might be unwilling to admit, whether to 
themselves or others, the effect of irrelevant disgust on the choice between the two objects.  In 
fact, participants in the present study reported that while the warnings made sense, they did not 
believe that their own choice between the two boxes was influenced by watching the disgusting 
film clip.  That is, the warning did not match participants’ awareness of their subjective 
experience.  Thus, unlike in the affect-as-information tradition (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983), the 
warnings here were unlikely to have been acknowledged and heeded – a difference that we 
speculated about above and that merits future examination.  
General Discussion 
Incidental feelings of disgust carry over to promote the disposal of currently owned 
objects unrelated to the induced disgust, and thus counteract SQB.  We call this the disgust-
promotes-disposal effect.  The effect is substantial.  Across studies and conditions, disgusted 
people were between 55% and 141% more likely to dispose of a present possession than were 
people in an unwarned neutral state.  A warning that changed behavior for those in the neutral 
state did not diminish the disgust-promotes-disposal effect.  Interestingly, disgust-condition Disgust disposal effect    17 
participants denied any influence of the disgust-inducing agent (a film clip) on their choices.  
Rather, they attributed their choices to rational, deliberative preferences, such as a fondness for 
oblong boxes.  This finding is consistent with the ATF hypothesis that, through a subconscious 
process, disgust triggers the implicit goal to dispose of current possessions and thus counteracts 
SQB.  The results add empirical evidence to the growing body of work demonstrating that 
specific emotions have a powerful effect on choices.   
Is the effect specific to disgust?   
One may wonder whether the observed effect is specific to disgust or whether it applies 
to negative emotions in general.  As was demonstrated in the manipulation check data, the disgust 
induction elicited discrete feelings of disgust rather than general negativity.  It did not make 
participants either angry or sad.  As an additional check, further analysis revealed that other 
negative emotions measured in the study, sadness and anger, do not explain additional variance in 
the observed disgust effect.  Therefore, it appears that the increased disposal of the status quo 
object observed in the current studies is attributable to disgust and not to other negative emotions.  
The possibility remains that other emotions may be able to produce a similar effect on 
SQB.  If so, we suspect that this would occur through a different mechanism.  For example, one 
could hypothesize that anger may counteract SQB.  Anger is associated with relative left frontal 
hemispheric activation in the brain – a pattern characteristic of approach motivation (Harmon-
Jones, 2003).  Anger may motivate decision makers to take actions and exchange current objects.   
In a different realm, one could hypothesize that social disgust (e.g., disgust over immoral 
action) may produce the same effect as physical disgust.  (For a comprehensive review of 
different kinds of disgust, see Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000.)  Data from an f-MRI study Disgust disposal effect    18 
support this speculation.  Increased activation in the anterior insula, a brain structure known to 
be involved in the experience of physical disgust (Phillips et al., 1997; Wicker et al., 2003), 
predicted participants’ decisions to reject unfair offers from their partners  (Sanfey, Rilling, 
Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003).  This suggests that social disgust may in fact share the same 
neural mechanisms as physical disgust, and thus may produce the same effect.  These interesting 
possibilities are beyond the scope of this paper and will hopefully be examined in future studies.   
Is the effect strong enough to reverse SQB?   
One might wonder whether the disgust effect has the potential to be strong enough to 
reverse SQB, which has generally been shown to be substantial.  The question of whether disgust 
would reverse or merely reduce SQB depends on the strength of both effects.  Our disgust 
induction was modest in three respects:  (a) it was generated by a movie that was tangentially 
related (at most) to the possessed object; (b) there was no taste or smell associated with the 
disgust induction, sensations that would likely increase the level of disgust; and (c) the object 
itself was neutral and in no way connected to items that might induce disgust, such as food.  If 
the object had been related to consumption rather than office supplies, the disposal effect might 
have been much greater.  It might even have been greater if participants had viewed the office 
supplies rather than being presented with them in a sealed box.  Therefore, even though we only 
observed reductions in SQB, we do not rule out a possibility that in other contexts disgust could 
cause a reversal in SQB. 
Practical Implications 
The finding that disgust promotes disposal has real-world implications that range from 
the minor to the monumental.  In a broad array of cases, people’s propensity to stick with the Disgust disposal effect    19 
status quo could be powerfully counteracted by feelings of incidental disgust.  In practice, the 
link between disgust and disposal will be more common when disgust is integral rather than 
incidental to the decision at hand, though more difficult to isolate.  Thus, a senior citizen who 
bathes insufficiently may suffer more social isolation than mere foul smell would seem to merit, 
perhaps accelerating a health decline via lack of social support (e.g., Hegelson & Cohen, 1996).  
Similarly, a cancer patient who is nauseated by chemotherapy drugs may be too inclined to 
switch to alternative treatments, to her detriment.  Transcending theoretical models of emotion 
and decision making, the implications of our findings apply to many of life’s choices. Disgust disposal effect    20 
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Footnotes 
1.  In a pilot study where a sporty water bottle and a highlighter set were used as the status-
quo and alternative commodities, 39% of disgust-condition participants traded away the 
status-quo commodity, whereas only 11% of neutral-condition participants traded it 
away, χ
2 (1, N = 41) = 4.04, p < .05, Φ = .31.   
2.  These particular terms were used for two reasons: (1) withholding a label for the target 
emotion (disgust) reduced demand characteristics associated with it; and (2) pilot testing 
for the warning revealed that even though participants subjectively experienced the 
neutral film (coral reef) as neutral, they verbally referred to the neutral film as a “pleasant 
film” rather than as a “neutral film” because they were not accustomed to thinking of a 
film as “neutral.” 
3.  There was one difference. In Study 1, participants hung up a card saying “Trade” if they 
wished to do so.  Study 2 made this format more balanced by giving them a second card 
saying “Keep” to hang if that was their preferred action. 
4.  An alternative explanation is that decision makers in the disgust condition eschewed the 
warning because they were angry at the experimenter for making them watch the 
unpleasant film clip.  This idea was empirically tested and received no support.  On a 
scale of 0 to 8, where 0 meant not experiencing the emotion at all, decision makers in both 
the disgust and neutral condition reported experiencing almost no anger whatsoever (Mn = 
0.51, Md = 0.86). 
5.  The effectiveness of the warning is notable, as there is no reason to believe that pleasant 
films do promote SQB. Disgust disposal effect    26 
6.  Another possibility is that incidental disgust may have promoted feelings of certainty 
that inhibited the careful cognitive effort needed to inhibit the disgust-promotes-disposal 
effect.  Specific emotions are reliably associated with particular sets of appraisals along 
such conceptual dimensions as pleasantness, control, responsibility, and certainty 
(Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1982; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1983).  In 
the case of disgust, people tend to strongly experience appraisals of certainty, in addition 
to appraisals along other dimensions (e.g., negative experience).  That is, they have a 
sense of knowing as opposed to a sense that they should question themselves.  Directly 
relevant to the present study, emotions characterized by a sense of certainty have been 
shown to promote heuristic cognitive processing rather than systematic cognitive 
processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  If correcting the disgust-disposal effect requires 
carefully disentangling the incidental disgust prime from the choice objects, then 
correction should be less likely to occur among disgusted participants who engage in 
heuristic processing due to their heightened sense of certainty than among those in a 
neutral state.  
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Table Captions 
Table 1. Propensities to Trade Away Status-Quo Object in Study1 
Status-Quo Object  Neutral Condition  Disgust Condition  Difference 
Oblong Box  21.1%  42.3%  21.2% 
Square Box  38.2%  59.3%  21.1% 
Across the Two Boxes  32.1%  50.9%  18.8% 
 
Table 2. Propensities to Trade Away Status-Quo Object in Study 2 
Choice  Emotion 
Condition 
De-Bias Condition 
Keep  Trade 
No Warning  86.2%  13.8% 
Neutral 
Warning  62.5%  37.5% 
No Warning  66.7%  33.3% 
Disgust 
Warning  69.0%  31.0% Disgust disposal effect    28 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The square and oblong boxes used in the studies  
 